3

Alberta E. BURNS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Petitioner, v.

UNITED STATES RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD.

No. 81-2293.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Sept. 24, 1982. Decided Feb. 25, 1983.

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Petition for Review of a Decision of the United States Railroad Retirement Board.

Gil Deford, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner.

Thomas W. Sadler, Gen. Atty., Railroad Retirement Bd., Chicago, 111., with whom Dale G. Zimmerman, Gen. Counsel, and Edward S. Hintzke, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Railroad Retirement Bd., Chicago, 111., were on the brief, for respondent.

Before MacKINNON and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges, and BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge MacKINNON. GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Petitioner, Alberta Burns, is a retiree who ranks within a special and dwindling category of social insurance recipients. She is a dual beneficiary. She receives primary benefits, on her own account, as a retired worker covered under the Social Security Act (SSA). She also receives derivative benefits as the surviving spouse of a worker covered under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA).^{Footnote 1} The SSA requires the reduction of a recipient's benefits by one dollar for every two dollars of income the recipient earns in excess of a statutorily defined exempt amount. 42 U.S.C. § 403(b). The RRA incorporates the SSA excess earnings provision by reference. 45 U.S.C. § 231a(g)(2).^{Footnote 2}

If the two fifty percent offset provisions, the one in the SSA and one in the RRA, are separately applied to each of the benefits a dual beneficiary receives, income earned in excess of the exempt amount^{Footnote 3} will yield, in

total, a one hundred percent or a dollar-fordollar offset. ^{Footnote 4}

In 1974, petitioner Burns earned The exempt amount that year was $2400. Thus, her excess earnings amounted to $1400. She reported her 1974 earnings to the Social Security Administration (Administration) and that agency deducted $744 from her social security benefits in 1976. ^{Footnote 5}

Two years later, the Railroad Retirement Board (Board) offset $700 against petitioner Burns's 1978 railroad retirement benefits to account for her excess earnings of $1400 in 1974. AR at 31-34. Burns unsuccessfully contested the Board's action through administrative channels. In re Alberta E. Burns, Railroad Retirement Act Claims Appeal Docket No. 1883. As authorized by 45 U.S.C. §§ 231g, 355(f), she now petitions this court to review the Board's December 11, 1980, decision rejecting her claim for recovery of the $700 deducted from her 1978 benefits. Burns sought to proceed here on behalf of a class. Our decision denying her motion for an order certifying the class and granting the Board's motion to dismiss the class element of the petition appears in a companion opinion. See Burns v. United States Railroad Retirement Board,  701 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1983).

Initially, Burns challenges the Board's offset as contrary to the intent of Congress.

If the Board correctly applied its governing statute, she argues alternately, the resulting dual offset is unconstitutional because it contravenes the equal protection principle. Finally, she urges that even if her statutory interpretation and constitutional arguments fail, the Board acted impermissibly in rejecting her request for waiver of the $700 recovery.

Petitioner Burns maintains principally that separate and independent excess earnings offsets by the Administration and the Board leave a dual beneficiary without any fruit from her labors; the dollar-for-dollar offset, she emphasizes, removes all incentive to earn more than the exempt amount.

But the laws that entitle her to dual benefits, on their face, also exact dual offsets. Because we do not believe a court is at liberty to excise either offset or to require the Administration and Board to coordinate deductions, each taking away less than its governing statute authorizes, we cannot embrace Burns's statutory construction or constitutional arguments. Nonetheless, we disagree with the Board's disposition of this case. For the reasons stated in part III of this opinion, we reverse the determination that petitioner Burns was "at fault" in causing the Board to overpay her $700, and instruct the Board to decide on remand whether recovery of the overpayment should be waived under the RRA's "purpose of [the Act]" or "equity or good conscience" standard. See 45 U.S.C. § 231i(c) (Board shall not recover overpayment to individual who is "without fault" if recovery "would be contrary to the purpose of [the Act] . . . or would be against equity or good conscience").

I. THE EARNED INCOME OFFSET PROVISIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO DUAL BENEFICIARIES The Social Security Act provides that "[deductions ... shall be made from any payment or payments under this subchapter to which an individual is entitled ... if for such month he is charged with excess earnings, under the provisions of subsection (f) of this section," 42 U.S.C. § 403(b); subsection (f), in turn, states that "an individual's excess earnings for a taxable year shall be 50 per centum of his earnings for such year in excess of [the exempt amount]," 42 U.S.C. § 403(f)(3). The Railroad Retirement Act, since 1954, has incorporated the SSA offset provision by reference. Social Security Amendments of 1954, Pub.L. No. 83-761, § 401(d), 68 Stat. 1052,1098. The RRA thus states that "[deductions ... shall be made from any payments to which a survivor is entitled ... if for such month such survivor would be charged with excess earnings under section 403(f) of Title 42 __ " 45 U.S.C. § 231a(g)(2).

Petitioner Burns acknowledges the literal meaning of these texts; she recognizes that "both Acts provide for an offset." Brief for Petitioner at 18. She argues, however, that the court should reject "narrow, overly-literal interpretation which contradicts the Congressional intent and purpose underlying the enactment of these statutory provisions." Id. at 19. But a statute "as complex as the Social Security Act," Dissent at 212, reflects many legislative concerns and purposes. It oversimplifies, we believe, to ascribe a sole purpose to the statutory scheme at issue here.

The vast majority of retirees covered under the SSA or the "RRA receive only one federal social insurance benefit. See supra note 1. No doubt Congress had these single benefit retirees in view in 1972 when it revised the SSA's excess earnings formula (and, by reference, the RRA's) to reduce all benefit deductions from dollar-for-dollar to one dollar for every two. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-603, § 105(a)(3), 86 Stat. 1329, 1341; see supra note 4. The evidence is indeed "overwhelming" that Congress reduced the offset to encourage social security beneficiaries to work. See Dissent at 209-210, 213-214. However, there is no evidence that Congress envisioned but one offset for the retiree who receives two federal social insurance benefits. Rather, it appears that in 1972, the year the fifty percent formula was spread across the board, ^{Footnote 6} as in preceding years, Congress did not advert specifically to the dual beneficiary's situation when it legislated offsets for earned income. See Dissent at 212. ^{Footnote 7}

Based on the "solicitude" Congress showed for gainfully-employed social security annuitants, cf. Dissent at 211-212, Burns urges that the work incentive purpose moticlude an excess earnings toll greater than fifty percent for single and dual beneficiaries alike. But the provisions Congress put in place in the two statutes express the opposite. It is treacherous to brush aside the literal meaning of those provisions and, by riveting attention on work incentive, avoid forthright recognition of another concern on the mind of Congress. That concern relates to the appropriateness of allowing a retiree to collect two federal social insurance benefits. See supra note 1. Congress initially prohibited RRA survivor annuitants from simultaneously receiv- is petitioner Burns, or in 1972, when the ing social security benefits; that restriction excess earnings offsets were reduced across was repealed in 1955. ^{Footnote 8}

In 1951, the RRA the board to fifty percent. was amended to eliminate dual benefits for that it can not be said with any secure employee annuitants; that amendment was support that Congress would have replied, repealed in 1954. ^{Footnote 9}

See D. Schreiber, Legis- "Yes, individuals who receive two benefits, lative History of the Railroad Retirement like individuals who receive only one, should and Railroad Unemployment Insurance Sys- be subject to but one offset for nonexempt tems 390-92 (1978) (detailed account of 197 shifting legislative positions on allowance of multiple benefits under RRA). Payment of these dual benefits "threatened the railroad retirement system with bankruptcy by the year 1981," United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,  449 U.S. 166, 169, 101 S.Ct. 453, 456, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980), and "prompt[ed] Congress [in 1974] to completely revise the Railroad Retirement Act to gradually eliminate dual benefits." Dissent at 204 n. 2. See supra note 1. In light of the ambivalence of Congress regarding allowance of dual benefits, and the legislature's ultimate rejection of them, we do not venture to guess how Congress would have responded had it been asked the question this case poses in 1955, when dual benefits were allowed to persons situated as ^{Footnote 10}

We note only u earnings." While we offer no speculation

as to what solution the legislature would have adopted had it specifically adverted to this case, we point out that on at least two occasions, information was placed before Congress concerning the double offset contested here.

First, in a 1972 report to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the Commission on Railroad Retirement, established by Congress in 1970 to recommend changes in the financially troubled system, described the RRA's then effective "survivor beneficiaries earnings test" as equivalent to the social security earnings test'which reduces the beneficiary's annuity by one dollar for every two earned between [the applicable amounts], thereafter on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Dual beneficiaries are, of course, subject to the various social security work clauses on their dual benefits. H.R.Doc. No. 350, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (1972) (emphasis supplied). Second, in 1976, a bill introduced in the House of Representatives proposed "amending] the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 to provide that amounts of excess earnings with which a social security benefit is charged shall not be used in making deductions from widows' benefits under the railroad retirement system." H.R. 14153, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The proposed amendment' would have achieved through legislation what petitioner Burns asks the court to order. We agree with Burns that introduction of this bill does not indicate legislative acquiescence in the Administration's and Board's position that dual benefits attract dual offsets, see Dissent at 210 n. 19, but the proposal does suggest that at least some members of Congress were cognizant of the agencies' position. ^{Footnote 12}

Since we cannot divine the lawmakers' will with respect to the special and only category of retirees the instant petition describes'recipients of dual benefits'we return to the scheme Congress adopted. Cf. Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,  447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980) ("Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."). The RRA authorizes petitioner Burns to retain her social security benefit in full while collecting her railroad retirement annuity in full. See supra note 7. Each Act calls for an identical earned income offset against benefits under that Act. Literal application of each offset provision is not readily labeled "eccentric," "absurd," or "unreasonable." But cf. Dissent at 206208 & nn. 11-13. Congress might well have considered a double offset a fitting match for a double benefit. The second offset for the dual beneficiary ameliorates the disparity in benefits received by similarly situated surviving spouses (persons covered by social insurance both on their own account and as spouses of covered workers), most of whom qualify for only one benefit. See supra note 1. In addition, dual recoupments, when a dual beneficiary's earned income exceeds the exempt amount, accord with the discrete character Congress still orders for the railroad retirement and social security funds. Further, there is nothing inherently arbitrary about a dollar-for-dollar offset; Congress could reasonably conclude that retired persons who earn income do not have the need fully retired persons have for replacement of pre-retirement income. In sum, while the wisdom of a dual or dollar-for-dollar offset is indeed debatable, "we think it clear that Congress could rationally choose to adopt such a course." Weinberger v. Salfi,  422 U.S. 749, 781, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2474, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975).

We note finally that even if we agreed with petitioner Burns that Congress unquestionably would have specified a fifty

percent solution had it focused on her situation, we would find her petition problematic. At bottom, her statutory construction S.Ct. 1074, 1084, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981). argument invites the court to order adjustments of the kind appropriately left to legislative determination. Cf. Califano v. Westcott,  443 U.S. 76, 91-93, 99 S.Ct. 2655, 2664-65, 61 L.Ed.2d 382 (1979). Questions such as these arise: Should one or the other ty percent excess earnings offsets exacted of the two offset provisions be excised for by the Administration and the Board viopersons situated as Burns is? Which offset, if either, would Congress have eliminated? Burns suggests, as one possible solution, a sequential rather than a simultaneous offset: first, an offset of fifty percent of her 1974 earnings over $2400 against her social security benefits, then a further offset of fifty percent against her railroad retirement benefits in the event she earned over $4800. Brief for Petitioner at 31-32. She proposes as the preferable solution forfeiture of fifty percent of her excess earnings "to the two agencies." Id. at 32.

The precise adjustment appropriate to bring the offset provisions in line with what petitioner Burns sees as the sole design of Congress is not immediately apparent. Her invitation for court-ordered amendment of one or both of the implicated statutory subsections involves "fine tuning" the judiciary should not undertake, "definitional and policy questions" judges are ill-equipped to resolve. Compare Califano v. Westcott, supra, 443 U.S. at 92, 93, 99 S.Ct. at 2664, 2665, with id. at 95 & n. 1, 99 S.Ct. at 2666 & n. 1 (Powell, J., dissenting). She cites no precedent in support of judicially-directed revision of legislation of the character in which she would have the court indulge. ^{Footnote 13}

In sum, despite the appeal of petitioner Burns's position, we are persuaded that hers is "a legislative, and not a legal, argument." Schweiker v. Wilson,  450 U.S. 221, 238, 101

II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DUAL OFFSETS Petitioner Burns asserts that separate fiflate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,  420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 1228 n. 2, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975). What we have said concerning the rationality of dual offsets as a match for dual benefits essentially disposes of her Constitution-based argument. See supra pp. 198-199.

The discrimination against dual beneficiaries alleged here does not rest on a characteristic, such as race or sex, triggering strict or heightened judicial scrutiny. Cf. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co.,  446 U.S. 142, 100 S.Ct. 1540, 64 L.Ed.2d 107 (1980) (workers' compensation scheme's gender-based discrimination violates equal protection); Califano v. Goldfarb,  430 U.S. 199, 97 S.Ct. 1021, 51 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977) (gender-based discrimination in social security program violates equal protection). Rather, as Burns acknowledges, social legislation of this sort, when no suspect or nearsuspect classification is involved, attracts a "significant presumption" of constitutionality. Brief for Petitioner at 38. See Schweiker v. Wilson, supra, 450 U.S. at 230, 101 S.Ct. at 1080. Plausible reasons support dual offsets when a federal social insurance recipient is allowed dual benefits. See su-

pra pp. 198-199. The "rational basis" criterion applicable here requires no more. See United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S. at 179, 101 S.Ct. at 461 ("Where ... there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision,' [citation omitted] because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute."). Sympathy for the circumstances of a complainant, or a belief that the legislation reviewed advances unsound policy, does not permit a court to deviate from this highly deferential standard. See, e.g., Califano v. Boles,  443 U.S. 282, 99 S.Ct. 2767, 61 L.Ed.2d 541 (1979); Califano v. Jobst,  434 U.S. 47, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977); Mathews v. De Castro,  429 U.S. 181, 97 S.Ct. 431, 50 L.Ed.2d 389 (1976). See also Yost v. Schweiker, 545 P.Supp. 591 (D.S.D.1982) (citing Fritz as controlling precedent and upholding SSA provision dictating that spouse divorced after marriage of 42 years is disqualified from receiving benefits under both SSA and RRA).

III. PETITIONER'S REQUEST TO WAIVE RECOVOF THE ASSERTED OVERPAYMENT ERY In 1978, the Board fully recouped the asserted $700 overpayment attributed to petitioner Burns's 1974 earnings above the $2400 exempt amount. Thereafter, upon obtaining legal assistance, Burns petitioned the Board to waive recovery under section 10(c) of the Railroad Retirement Act, which provides, in pertinent part: There shall be no recovery in any case in which more than the correct amount of annuities or other benefits has been paid ... to an individual ... who, in the judgment of the Board, is without fault when, in the judgment of the Board, recovery would be contrary to the purpose of [the Act] ... or would be against equity or good conscience. 45 U.S.C. § 231i(c). ^{Footnote 14}

The Board denied the waiver request; ^{Footnote 15} it ruled that, because petitioner Burns did not report her 1974 earnings to the Board (although she did report them to the Social Security Administration), she was "at fault in causing the overpayment," AR at 4, therefore she was ineligible for a waiver. We conclude that the Board's attribution of fault to Burns is not supported by substantial evidence. ^{Footnote 16}

Accordingly, we vacate the order here on review and remand the case to the Board with instructions to grant the waiver request if the Board determines, in accordance with section 10(c), that recoupment from petitioner Burns is not impelled by the purpose of the Act or by equity or good conscience. See, e.g., Hays v. Finch, 306 F.Supp. 115 (W.D.Pa.1969).

A. The fault attribution

The Board acted to recoup benefits paid to Burns precisely because she reported her 1974 earnings: her report to the Social Security Administration caused that agency to recoup $744 by suspending her social security benefits for more than two months in

1976; ^{Footnote 17} when the Administration reported those same earnings to the Board, it in turn when Burns filed her application for a surrecouped $700 two years later by suspend- vivor's annuity under the RRA, she received ing her survivor's annuity for four and one half months. AR at 31-34. In reviewing the Board's attribution of fault to petitioner Burns we proceed from the undisputed fact that she did not conceal her earnings. ^{Footnote 18}

Instead, she timely and accurately reported her earnings to the Social Security Administration, the government agency responsible for administration of her primary social insurance benefit. ^{Footnote 19}

Cf. Rini v. Harris,  615 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.1980) (fault lies with agency, not with recipient, when agency fails to provide clear, timely information concerning benefit entitlement). The Board maintains, however, that Burns was at fault because she failed to twice report her earnings. She should have known, the Board contends, that the RRA required an offset for excess earnings separate from the social security offset, and a filing separate from the report she made to the Administration. To support its view of what Burns should have known and its consequent fault determination, the Board points to two considerations. First, in 1969, a pamphlet instructing her, inter alia, to report earnings over the exempt amount.

See Brief for Respondent App. B. ^{Footnote 20}

At that time, she signed a printed form certifying that the pamphlet's contents had been explained to her and that she understood she must tell the Board of her earnings in excess of the exempt amount. See AR at 22.

Second, in 1973, she was informed of a $26 RRA survivor's annuity overpayment occasioned by her excess earnings, see AR at 29; according to the Board, the 1973 notice should have alerted her to the need to report her 1974 earnings to both agencies.

Turning first to the Board's 1973 recoupment of $26 based on petitioner Burns's receipt one year of $53.60 in annual earnings over the exempt limit, ^{Footnote 21} the asserted alert to Burns is not readily discerned.

Nothing in the record indicates any corresponding SSA recoupment. Nor does the 1973 overpayment notice refer to any default on Burns's part in failing to report

earnings to the Board. AR at 29. ^{Footnote 22}

short, this evidence of an alerting circumstance adequate to justify the Board's fault finding appears highly insubstantial.

While the pamphlet Burns received in 1969 did inform her of the fifty percent offset applicable under the RRA, it did not explain that the offset operated twice against a person in her situation. Rather, it simply conveyed that she would lose one dollar in benefits for every two dollars of yearly earnings above the statutory ceiling. ^{Footnote 23}

The Social Security Administration was no more enlightening. Indeed, after petitioner Burns reported her 1974 earnings to the Administration, the responsive overpayment notice she received informed her: "You will never have more than $1 in benefits withheld for each $2 of earnings above [the exempt level]." AR at 36.

Petitioner Burns stated in her waiver request that although she received the "handbook" from the Board, she did not read it. AR at 45. She noted the small type "difficult to read for the elderly." AR at 12. ^{Footnote 24}

And she stressed that all the information the Administration and Board gave her appeared "the same as to reporting requirements and withholding $1 for every $2." Id. She understood that the two benefits schemes were "coordinated with and by the Social Security Administration and the Railroad Retirement Board"; therefore, she "assumed that reporting her earnings to either government agency" satisfied her obIn ligation to report. Id. Most pointedly, she said, "I never thought I would be charged twice for going over the limit and lose all that money I had earned or I would not have worked past the limit." AR at 45.

This court has divided on the question whether, under the governing statutes, Burns could "be charged twice for going over the limit," thereby "lospng] all [the] money she had earned." In light of the division on the court, it is all the more difficult to charge her with fault for her understanding of the advice she received from the Administration and the Board concerning benefit offsets for excess earnings. ^{Footnote 25}

Cf. Hays v. Finch, supra, 306 F.Supp. at 120 (holding plaintiff not at fault in accepting a lump sum social security benefit a second time, observing that the agency's fault finding "might be appropriate if plaintiff were an accountant"). In sum, on the record this case presents, the Board's denial of a waiver to petitioner Burns on the ground that she was at fault is not tenable.

B. The remaining waiver criteria Since the Board held Burns at fault, it did not reach the further questions whether recoupment would conflict with the purpose of the Act or with equity or good conscience. See 45 U.S.C. § 231i(c). As to those standards, Board regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 255 12, list among factors meriting ;

consideration at the time of a proposed recoupment: ^{Footnote 26} (d) The extent to which the individual is dependent upon the current payment of his annuity or pension for the necessities of life.

Similarly, Social Security Act regulations governing waivers provide that recoupment would "defeat the purposes of [the Act]" in situations where the person from whom recovery is sought needs substantially all of his current income (including social security monthly benefits) to meet current ordinary and necessary living ex

20 C.F.R. § 404.508(b).

Judged by "hardship" considerations of this nature, ^{Footnote 27} petitioner Burns's waiver request would appear compelling. At the time of recoupment, she was 74 years old and living entirely on her own social security benefits and her railroad survivor's annuity. ^{Footnote 28}

Her total monthly income from these benefits was $570, her monthly living expenses, $417.50. See AR at 44. The amount withheld by the Board for four and one half months constituted close to 25% of her monthly income. And the recoupment meant that she had labored for no monetary gain, although that was hardly her intention. See AR at 45.

The "hardship" waiver criteria, however, were not addressed by the Board, and the question is one for initial administrative determination subject to court review. We therefore remand this case to the Board for expeditious determination whether, in view of petitioner Burns's satisfaction of the "without fault" criterion, waiver of recovery would be consonant with the Act's purpose or with equity or good conscience.

Reversed and remanded.

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Petitioner, Alberta Burns, receives benefits under both the Railroad Retirement Act and the Social Security Act. Both Acts contain provisions which authorize the reduction of a recipient's benefits by $1 for every $2 of the recipient's "excess earnings" 'those earnings which exceed a statutorily penses. defined level each year. The Railroad Retirement Board (Board) and the Social Security Administration (Administration) both interpret these excess earnings provisions to permit them to reduce a recipient's benefits for excess earnings irrespective of whether the other agency has also reduced the recipient's benefits for the same earnings. As a result, individuals, such as petitioner, who receive benefits under both Acts are subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $1 of excess earnings, up to the total of benefits received.

Petitioner challenges a decision of the Board affirming the determination of an appeals referee that she was overpaid $700 in Railroad Retirement benefits in 1974 as a result of excess earnings that year, and that waiver of recovery of the overpayment by the Board was not appropriate. Prior to the Board's decision, the Administration had reduced petitioner's Social Security benefits because of her excess earnings in 1974. Petitioner asserts that the Board's interpretation of the excess earnings provisions defeats the intent of Congress and violates equal protection and due process under the Fifth Amendment. Alternative-

ly, petitioner argues that the Board erred in refusing to waive recovery of the overpayment of benefits. The excess earnings provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act and the Social Security Act have a common purpose'ensuring that benefits are only paid to persons who are truly retired, while encouraging such persons to work to supplement their benefits. As such, the provisions of the two statutes must be read in pari materia to effectuate this clearly articulated purpose. I find that the Board's policy with respect to reducing benefits for excess earnings is a narrow, overly-literal interpretation of the excess earnings provisions which defeats the obvious intent of Congress in amending those provisions to encourage retired persons to work by reducing their benefits by only $1 for every $2 of excess earnings.^{Footnote 1}

Accordingly, I would reverse the Board's decision and direct the Board to pay petitioner the $700 withheld from her benefits because of her 1974 earnings. Because the majority upholds the Board's interpretation of the excess earnings provisions, at 196199,1 respectfully dissent.

I. The Railroad Retirement Act^{Footnote 2}

provides for payment of benefits to railroad workers who have satisfied work-related requirements, as well as to certain of their dependents and survivors. 45 U.S.C. § 231a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The program is financed by the contributions of both employers and employees and is administered by the Board, an independent agency of the United States. Id. § 231f. The Social Security Act establishes a program which provides similar benefits and is financed in a similar fashion, but is separately administered by the Administration pursuant to that Act.

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

Both the Railroad Retirement Act and the Social Security Act provide that benefits will be reduced if a recipient has earnings which exceed a statutorily defined level in a year. Benefits under the Social Security Act are subject to a $1 deduction for every $2 of such excess earnings. 42 U.S.C. § 403 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).^{Footnote 3} The

Railroad Retirement Act also provides for a $1 deduction for each $2 of excess earnings by incorporating the excess earnings provision of the Social Security Act by reference. 45 U.S.C. § 231a(g) (1976). ^{Footnote 4}

Neither Act explicitly indicates how deductions for excess earnings are to be made if an individual receives benefits under both programs. Both Acts are silent with respect to individuals in that circumstance. Nevertheless, both the Board and the Administration read the excess earnings provisions literally and reduce the benefits they administer by 50 percent of excess earnings without regard to the 50 percent reduction imposed by the other agency. As a result, persons receiving benefits under both the Railroad Retirement Act and the Social Security Act have 100 percent of their excess earnings recovered by the agencies, until the deduction equals the total benefit received. In 1974, petitioner was receiving survivors' benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act based on her deceased husband's work record, and primary benefits under the Social Security Act based on her own work record. That year she earned $3800, $1400 over the then existing statutory earnings limit of $2400. ^{Footnote 5}

Petitioner reported these earnings to the Administration and it deducted $744 from her benefits in 1976. ^{Footnote 6}

In

1978, the Board notified petitioner that the Administration had informed it of her 1974 excess earnings and that, as a result of those earnings, she had been overpaid $700 in Railroad Retirement Act benefits in 1974. Accordingly, the Board deducted that amount from her benefits in 1978. Administrative Record at 31-34.

Petitioner administratively challenged the Board's deduction of the $700 from her benefits. The Board's Bureau of Retirement Claims rejected her appeal, and its decision was sustained by a Board appeals referee. The Board upheld the referee's findings, holding that the Railroad Retirement "Act contains no exception to the earnings limitation for those individuals who are also receiving a social security benefit subject to the same limitation." In re Alberta E. Burns, Railroad Retirement Act Claims Appeal Docket No. 1883, 2 (U.S.R.R. Retirement Bd. Dec. 11, 1980),-Administrative Record at 2,3. Petitioner subsequently filed her petition for review with this Court. ^{Footnote 7}

II.

A. Propriety of Looking to Legislative History for Guidance It is clear that 42 U.S.C. § 403 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) ^{Footnote 8} and 45 U.S.C. § 231a(g) (1976) ^{Footnote 9} authorize the Board and the Administration to deduct $1 from an individual's benefits for every $2 of excess earnings. However, neither the Railroad Retirement Act nor the Social Security Act specifies how deductions for excess earnings are to be made from individuals receiving benefits under both programs. Petitioner argues that the Board's policy of deducting 50 percent of excess earnings from a recipient's benefits irrespective of whether the Administration has also deducted 50 percent of those excess earnings "is a narrow, overlyliteral interpretation which contradicts the Congressional intent . . .." Brief for Petitioner at 19. Respondent counters that where, as here, "the statutory language is clear and unequivocal, there is no need to analyze legislative history to determine legislative intent." Brief for Respondent at 19. Thus, at the outset, it is necessary to determine the propriety of looking to legislative history for guidance as to the proper interpretation of the excess earnings provisions.

The function of this Court in interpreting an act of Congress "is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress." United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns,  310 U.S. 534, 542, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940) (footnote omitted). Often the language of a statute may so clearly reveal the purpose for its enactment that resort to aids of construction such as legislative history is unnecessary to properly interpret the statute. ^{Footnote 10}

Yet it is axiomatic that a court should not interpret a statute according to its literal

meaning if to do so would produce absurd or unreasonable results contrary to its purpose. ^{Footnote 11}

As Justice Reed stated in American Trucking: When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results . . . this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act.... [E]ven when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one "plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole" this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no "rule of law" which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on "superficial examination." The interpretation of the meaning of statutes as applied to justiciable controversies, is exclusively a judicial function. Id. at 543^4, 60 S.Ct. at 1063-64 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ozawa v. United States,