M. L. B. v. S. L. J., individually and as next friend S. L. J. and of the minor children, M. L. J., et ux.

certiorari to the supreme court of mississippi

No. 95­853. Argued October 7, 1996--Decided December 16, 1996

In a decree forever terminating petitioner M. L. B.'s parental rights to her two minor children, a Mississippi Chancery Court recited a segment of the governing Mississippi statute and stated, without elaboration, that respondents, the children's natural father and his second wife, had met their burden of proof by "clear and convincing evidence."

The Chancery Court, however, neither described the evidence nor otherwise revealed precisely why M. L. B. was decreed a stranger to her children. M. L. B. filed a timely appeal from the termination decree, but Mississippi law conditioned her right to appeal on prepayment of record preparation fees estimated at $2,352.36.

Lacking funds to pay the fees, M. L. B. sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied her application on the ground that, under its precedent, there is no right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil appeals. Urging that the size of her pocketbook should not be dispositive when "an interest far more precious than any property right" is at stake, Santosky v. Kramer,  455 U.S. 745, 758­759, M. L. B. contends in this Court that a State may not, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees.

Held: Just as a State may not block an indigent petty offender's access to an appeal afforded others, see Mayer v. Chicago,  404 U.S. 189, 195­196, so Mississippi may not deny M. L. B., because of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court based its parental termination decree.

Pp. 110­128. (a) The foundation case in the relevant line of decisions is Griffin v. Illinois,  351 U.S. 12, in which the Court struck down an Illinois rule that effectively conditioned thoroughgoing appeals from criminal convictions on the defendant's procurement of a transcript of trial proceedings. The Illinois rule challenged in Griffin deprived most defendants lacking the means to pay for a transcript of any access to appellate review. Although the Federal Constitution guarantees no right to appellate review, id., at 18 (plurality opinion), once a State affords that right, Griffinheld, the State may not "bolt the door to equal justice," id., at 24 (Frank-

furter, J., concurring in judgment). The Griffin plurality drew support for its decision from the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, id., at 13, 18, while Justice Frankfurter emphasized and explained the decision's equal protection underpinning, id., at 23.

Of prime relevance to the question presented by M. L. B., Griffin's principle has not been confined to cases in which imprisonment is at stake, but extends to appeals from convictions of petty offenses, involving conduct "quasi criminal" in nature.

Mayer, 404 U. S., at 196, 197. In contrast, an indigent defendant's right to counsel at state expense does not extend to nonfelony trials if no term of imprisonment is actually imposed. Scott v. Illinois,  440 U.S. 367, 373­374. Pp. 110­113. (b) This Court has also recognized a narrow category of civil cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees. See, e. g., Boddie v. Connecticut,  401 U.S. 371, 374 (divorce proceedings). Making clear, however, that a constitutional requirement to waive court fees in civil cases is the exception, not the general rule, the Court has refused to extend Griffin to the broad array of civil cases.

See United States v. Kras,  409 U.S. 434, 445; Ortwein v. Schwab,  410 U.S. 656, 661 (per curiam). But the Court has consistently set apart from the mine run of civil cases those involving state controls or intrusions on family relationships. In that domain, to guard against undue official intrusion, the Court has examined closely and contextually the importance of the governmental interest advanced in defense of the intrusion.

Pp. 113­116. (c) M. L. B.'s case, involving the State's authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, demands the close consideration the Court has long required when a family association "of basic importance in our society" is at stake.

Boddie, 401 U. S., at 376. The Court approaches M. L. B.'s petition mindful of the gravity of the sanction imposed on her and in light of two prior decisions most immediately in point: Lassiterv. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.,  452 U.S. 18 (appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in parental status termination proceedings is not routinely required by the Constitution, but should be determined on a case-by-case basis), and Santosky v. Kramer,  455 U.S. 745 ("clear and convincing" proof standard is constitutionally required in parental termination proceedings).

Although both Lassiter and Santosky yielded divided opinions, the Court was unanimously of the view that "the interest of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,"

Santosky, 455 U. S., at 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and that "[f]ew consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties," id., at 787. Pp. 116­119.

(d) Guided by Lassiter, Santosky, and other decisions acknowledging the primacy of the parent-child relationship, the Court agrees with M. L. B. that Mayer points to the disposition proper in this case: Her parental termination appeal must be treated as the Court has treated petty offense appeals, and Mississippi may not withhold the transcript she needs to gain review of the order ending her parental status.

The Court's decisions concerning access to judicial processes, commencing with Griffin and running through Mayer, reflect both equal protection and due process concerns.

See Ross v. Moffitt,  417 U.S. 600, 608­ 609. In these cases, "[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge." Bearden v. Georgia,  461 U.S. 660, 665. A "precise rationale" has not been composed, Ross, 417 U. S., at 608, because cases of this order "cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis," Bearden, 461 U. S., at 666.

Nevertheless, "[m]ost decisions in this area," the Court has recognized, "res[t] on an equal protection framework," id., at 665, as M. L. B.'s plea heavily does, for due process does not independently require that the State provide a right to appeal. Placing this case within the framework established by the Court's past decisions in this area, the Court inspects the character and intensity of the individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State's justification for its exaction, on the other.

See id., at 666­667. As in the case of the indigent petty offender charged in Mayer, the stakes for M. L. B. are large. Parental status termination is "irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]" of the most fundamental family relationship. Santosky, 455 U. S., at 753. And the risk of error, Mississippi's experience shows, is considerable. Mississippi has, consistent with Santosky, adopted a "clear and convincing proof " standard for parental status termination cases, but the Chancellor's order in this case simply recites statutory language; it describes no evidence, and otherwise details no reasons for finding M. L. B. "clear[ly] and convincing[ly]" unfit to be a parent.

Only a transcript can reveal the sufficiency, or insufficiency, of the evidence to support that stern judgment. Mississippi's countervailing interest in offsetting the costs of its court system is unimpressive when measured against the stakes for M. L. B. The record discloses that, in the tightly circumscribed category of parental status termination cases, appeals are few, and not likely to impose an undue burden on the State.

Moreover, it would be anomalous to recognize a right to a transcript needed to appeal a misdemeanor conviction--though trial counsel may be flatly denied such a defendant--but hold, at the same time, that a transcript need not be prepared for M. L. B.--though were her defense sufficiently complex, state-paid counsel, as Lassiter instructs, would be designated for her.

While the Court does not question the general rule, stated in Ortwein, 410 U. S., at 660, that fee re-

quirements ordinarily are examined only for rationality, the Court's cases solidly establish two exceptions to that rule. The basic right to participate in political processes as voters and candidates cannot be limited to those who can pay for a license. See, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,  383 U.S. 663. Nor may access to judicial processes in cases criminal or "quasi criminal" in nature, Mayer, 404 U. S., at 196, turn on ability to pay. The Court places decrees forever terminating parental rights in the category of cases in which the State may not "bolt the door to equal justice." Griffin, 351 U. S., at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment). Pp. 119­124. (e) Contrary to respondents' contention, cases in which the Court has held that government need not provide funds so that people can exercise even fundamental rights, see, e. g., Lyng v. Automobile Workers,  485 U.S. 360, 363, n. 2, 370­374, are inapposite here.

Complainants in those cases sought state aid to subsidize their privately initiated action or to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic circumstances that existed apart from state action.

M. L. B.'s complaint is of a different order. She is endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction of her family bonds, and to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness adjudication. Like a defendant resisting criminal conviction, she seeks to be spared from the State's devastatingly adverse action. That is the very reason this Court has paired her case with Mayer, not with Ortwein or Kras.

Also rejected is respondents' suggestion that Washington v. Davis,  426 U.S. 229, 242, effectively overruled the Grif-fin line of cases in 1976 by rejecting the notion "that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another."

That this Court has not so conceived the meaning and effect of Washington v. Davis is demonstrated by Bearden, 461 U. S., at 664­665, in which the Court adhered in 1983 to "Griffin's principle of `equal justice.' "

The Court recognized in Griffin that "a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in operation," 351 U. S., at 17, n. 11, and explained in Williams v. Illinois,  399 U.S. 235, 242, that an Illinois statute it found unconstitutional in that case "in operative effect expose[d] only indigents to the risk of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum."

Like the sanction in Williams, the Mississippi prescription here at issue is not merely disproportionate in impact, but wholly contingent on one's ability to pay, thereby "visit[ing] different consequences on two categories of persons."

Ibid. A failure rigidly to restrict Griffin to cases typed "criminal" will not result in the opening of judicial floodgates, as respondents urge. This Court has repeatedly distinguished parental status termination decrees from mine run civil actions

on the basis of the unique deprivation termination decrees work: permanent destruction of all legal recognition of the parental relationship. Lassiter and Santosky have not served as precedent in other areas, and the Court is satisfied that the label "civil" should not entice it to leave undisturbed the Mississippi courts' disposition of this case.

Cf. In re Gault,  387 U.S. 1, 50. Pp. 124­128. (f ) Thus, Mississippi may not withhold from M. L. B. "a `record of sufficient completeness' to permit proper [appellate] consideration of [her] claims." Mayer, 404 U. S., at 198. P. 128.

Reversed and remanded.

delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, JJ., joined. filed an opinO'Connor, Souter, Kennedy, J., ion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 128. C. J., filed a Rehnquist, dissenting opinion, post, p. 129. filed a dissenting opinion, in Thomas, J., which Scalia, J., joined, and in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, except as to Part II, post, p. 129.

Robert B. McDuff argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Danny Lampley and Steven R.Shapiro.

Rickey T. Moore, Special Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Mike Moore, Attorney General.^{Footnote *}

delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Ginsburg

By order of a Mississippi Chancery Court, petitioner M. L. B.'s parental rights to her two minor children were forever terminated. M. L. B. sought to appeal from the termination decree, but Mississippi required that she pay in advance record preparation fees estimated at $2,352.36.

Because M. L. B. lacked funds to pay the fees, her appeal was dismissed.

Urging that the size of her pocketbook should not be dispositive when "an interest far more precious than any property right" is at stake, Santosky v. Kramer,  455 U.S. 745,

758­759 (1982), M. L. B. tenders this question, which we agreed to hear and decide: May a State, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees?

We hold that, just as a State may not block an indigent petty offender's access to an appeal afforded others, see Mayer v. Chicago,  404 U.S. 189, 195­196 (1971), so Mississippi may not deny M. L. B., because of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a parent.

I

Petitioner M. L. B. and respondent S. L. J. are, respectively, the biological mother and father of two children, a boy born in April 1985, and a girl born in February 1987. In June 1992, after a marriage that endured nearly eight years, M. L. B. and S. L. J. were divorced. The children remained in their father's custody, as M. L. B. and S. L. J. had agreed at the time of the divorce.

S. L. J. married respondent J. P. J. in September 1992. In November of the following year, S. L. J. and J. P. J. filed suit in Chancery Court in Mississippi, seeking to terminate the parental rights of M. L. B. and to gain court approval for adoption of the children by their stepmother, J. P. J.

The complaint alleged that M. L. B. had not maintained reasonable visitation and was in arrears on child support payments. M. L. B. counterclaimed, seeking primary custody of both children and contending that S. L. J. had not permitted her reasonable visitation, despite a provision in the divorce decree that he do so.

After taking evidence on August 18, November 2, and December 12, 1994, the Chancellor, in a decree filed December 14, 1994, terminated all parental rights of the natural mother, approved the adoption, and ordered that J. P. J., the adopting parent, be shown as the mother of the children on

their birth certificates. Twice reciting a segment of the governing Mississippi statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 93­15­ 103(3)(e) (1994), the Chancellor declared that there had been a "substantial erosion of the relationship between the natural mother, [M. L. B.], and the minor children," which had been caused "at least in part by [M. L. B.'s] serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence or unreasonable failure to visit or communicate with her minor children."

App. to Pet. for Cert. 9, 10. ^{Footnote 1} The Chancellor stated, without elaboration, that the natural father and his second wife had met their burden of proof by "clear and convincing evidence." Id., at 10. Nothing in the Chancellor's order describes the evidence, however, or otherwise reveals precisely why M. L. B. was decreed, forevermore, a stranger to her children.

In January 1995, M. L. B. filed a timely appeal and paid the $100 filing fee. The Clerk of the Chancery Court, several days later, estimated the costs for preparing and transmitting the record: $1,900 for the transcript (950 pages at $2 per page); $438 for other documents in the record (219 pages at $2 per page); $4.36 for binders; and $10 for mailing.

Id., at 15. Mississippi grants civil litigants a right to appeal, but conditions that right on prepayment of costs. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11­51­3, 11­51­29 (Supp. 1996). Relevant portions of a transcript must be ordered, and its preparation costs ad-

vanced by the appellant, if the appellant "intends to urge on appeal," as M. L. B. did, "that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence." Miss. Rule of App. Proc. 10(b)(2) (1995); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 11­51­29 (Supp. 1996).

Unable to pay $2,352.36, M. L. B. sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied her application in August 1995. Under its precedent, the court said, "[t]he right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil cases exists only at the trial level." App. to Pet. for Cert. 3. ^{Footnote 2} M. L. B. had urged in Chancery Court and in the Supreme Court of Mississippi, and now urges in this Court, that

"where the State's judicial processes are invoked to secure so severe an alteration of a litigant's fundamental rights--the termination of the parental relationship with one's natural child--basic notions of fairness [and] of equal protection under the law, . . . guaranteed by [the Mississippi and Federal Constitutions], require that a person be afforded the right of appellate review though one is unable to pay the costs of such review in advance." Id., at 18. ^{Footnote 3}

II

Courts have confronted, in diverse settings, the "age-old problem" of "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike." Griffin v. Illinois,  351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956). Concerning access to appeal in general, and transcripts needed to pursue appeals in particular, Griffin is the foundation case.

Griffin involved an Illinois rule that effectively conditioned thoroughgoing appeals from criminal convictions on the defendant's procurement of a transcript of trial proceedings.

See id., at 13­14, and nn. 2, 3 (noting, inter alia, that "mandatory record," which an indigent defendant could obtain free of charge, did not afford the defendant an opportunity to seek review of trial errors).

Indigent defendants, other than those sentenced to death, were not excepted from the rule, so in most cases, defendants without means to pay for a transcript had no access to appellate review at all.

Although the Federal Constitution guarantees no right to appellate review, id., at 18, once a State affords that right, Grif-fin held, the State may not "bolt the door to equal justice," id., at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment).

The plurality in Griffin recognized "the importance of appellate review to a correct adjudication of guilt or innocence." Id., at 18. "[T]o deny adequate review to the poor," the plurality observed, "means that many of them may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions which appellate courts would set aside."

Id., at 19.

Judging the Illinois rule inconsonant with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Griffin plurality drew support from the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.

Id., at 13, 18. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the judgment in Griffin, emphasized and explained the decision's equal protection underpinning:

"Of course a State need not equalize economic conditions. . . . But when a State deems it wise and just that

convictions be susceptible to review by an appellate court, it cannot by force of its exactions draw a line which precludes convicted indigent persons, forsooth erroneously convicted, from securing such a review . . . ." Id., at 23.

See also Ross v. Moffitt,  417 U.S. 600, 607 (1974) (Griffin and succeeding decisions "stand for the proposition that a State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons."). Summarizing the Griffin line of decisions regarding an indigent defendant's access to appellate review of a conviction, ^{Footnote 4}

we said in Rinaldi v. Yeager,  384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966): "This Court has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts."

Of prime relevance to the question presented by M. L. B.'s petition, Griffin's principle has not been confined to cases in which imprisonment is at stake. The key case is Mayer v.

Chicago,  404 U.S. 189 (1971). Mayer involved an indigent defendant convicted on nonfelony charges of violating two city ordinances. Fined $250 for each offense, the defendant petitioned for a transcript to support his appeal. He alleged prosecutorial misconduct and insufficient evidence to convict. The State provided free transcripts for indigent appellants

in felony cases only. We declined to limit Griffin to cases in which the defendant faced incarceration. "The invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available only to those who can pay," the Court said in Mayer, "is not erased by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed."

404 U. S., at 197. Petty offenses could entail serious collateral consequences, the Mayer Court noted. Ibid. The Griffin principle, Mayer underscored, "is a flat prohibition," 404 U. S., at 196, against "making access to appellate processes from even [the State's] most inferior courts depend upon the [convicted] defendant's ability to pay," id., at 197.

An impecunious party, the Court ruled, whether found guilty of a felony or conduct only "quasi criminal in nature," id., at 196, "cannot be denied a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper [appellate] consideration of his claims," id., at 198 (internal quotation marks omitted). ^{Footnote 5}

In contrast to the "flat prohibition" of "bolted doors" that the Griffin line of cases securely established, the right to

counsel at state expense, as delineated in our decisions, is less encompassing. A State must provide trial counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony, Gideon v. Wain-wright,  372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963), but that right does not extend to nonfelony trials if no term of imprisonment is actually imposed, Scott v. Illinois,  440 U.S. 367, 373­374 (1979). A State's obligation to provide appellate counsel to poor defendants faced with incarceration applies to appeals of right. Douglas v. California,  372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).

In Ross v.

Moffitt, however, we held that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause requires a State to provide counsel at state expense to an indigent prisoner pursuing a discretionary appeal in the state system or petitioning for review in this Court.

417 U. S., at 610, 612, 616­618. III

We have also recognized a narrow category of civil cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees. In Boddie v. Connecticut,  401 U.S. 371 (1971), we held that the State could not deny a divorce to a married couple based on their inability to pay approximately $60 in court costs. Crucial to our decision in Boddie was the fundamental interest at stake.

"[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship," we said, due process "prohibit[s] a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages."

Id., at 374; see also Little v. Streater,  452 U.S. 1, 13­17 (1981) (State must pay for blood grouping tests sought by an indigent defendant to enable him to contest a paternity suit).

Soon after Boddie, in Lindsey v. Normet,  405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court confronted a double-bond requirement imposed by Oregon law only on tenants seeking to appeal ad-

verse decisions in eviction actions. We referred first to precedent recognizing that, "if a full and fair trial on the merits is provided, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a State to provide appellate review."

Id., at 77. We next stated, however, that "[w]hen an appeal is afforded, . . . it cannot be granted to some litigants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause."

Ibid. Oregon's double-bond requirement failed equal protection measurement, we concluded, because it raised a substantial barrier to appeal for a particular class of litigants--tenants facing eviction--a barrier "faced by no other civil litigant in Oregon."

Id., at 79. The Court pointed out in Lindsey that the classification there at issue disadvantaged nonindigent as well as indigent appellants, ibid.; the Lindsey decision, therefore, does not guide our inquiry here.

The following year, in United States v. Kras,  409 U.S. 434 (1973), the Court clarified that a constitutional requirement to waive court fees in civil cases is the exception, not the general rule.

Kras concerned fees, totaling $50, required to secure a discharge in bankruptcy. Id., at 436. The Court recalled in Kras that "[o]n many occasions we have recognized the fundamental importance . . . under our Constitution" of "the associational interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of th[e] [marital] relationship." Id., at 444. ^{Footnote 6}

But bankruptcy discharge entails no "funda-

mental interest," we said. Id., at 445. Although "obtaining [a] desired new start in life [is] important," that interest, the Court explained, "does not rise to the same constitutional level" as the interest in establishing or dissolving a marriage. Ibid. ^{Footnote 7}

Nor is resort to court the sole path to securing debt forgiveness, we stressed; in contrast, termination of a marriage, we reiterated, requires access to the State's judicial machinery.

Id., at 445­446; see Boddie, 401 U. S., at 376. In Ortwein v. Schwab,  410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam), the Court adhered to the line drawn in Kras. The appellants in Ortwein sought court review of agency determinations reducing their welfare benefits. Alleging poverty, they challenged, as applied to them, an Oregon statute requiring appellants in civil cases to pay a $25 fee. We summarily affirmed the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment rejecting appellants' challenge. As in Kras, the Court saw no " `fundamental interest . . . gained or lost depending on the availability' of the relief sought by [the complainants]." 410

U. S., at 659 (quoting Kras, 409 U. S., at 445). Absent a fundamental interest or classification attracting heightened scrutiny, we said, the applicable equal protection standard

"is that of rational justification," a requirement we found satisfied by Oregon's need for revenue to offset the expenses of its court system.

410 U. S., at 660. We expressly rejected the Ortwein appellants' argument that a fee waiver was required for all civil appeals simply because the State chose to permit in forma pauperis filings in special classes of civil appeals, including appeals from terminations of parental rights.

Id., at 661. In sum, as Ortwein underscored, this Court has not extended Griffin to the broad array of civil cases. But tellingly, the Court has consistently set apart from the mine run of cases those involving state controls or intrusions on family relationships.

In that domain, to guard against undue official intrusion, the Court has examined closely and contextually the importance of the governmental interest advanced in defense of the intrusion.

Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland,  431 U.S. 494 (1977). IV

Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as "of basic importance in our society," Boddie, 401 U. S., at 376, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.

See, for example, Turner v. Safley,  482 U.S. 78 (1987), Zablocki v. Redhail,  434 U.S. 374 (1978), and Lovingv. Virginia,  388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Okla-homa ex rel. Williamson,  316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,  268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyerv. Nebraska,  262 U.S. 390 (1923) (raising children). M. L. B.'s case, involving the State's authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, ^{Footnote 8}

demands the close consider-